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Abstract 
We relate relationship satisfaction and thoughts about leaving a romantic relationship to 
a couple’s relative and absolute resources and check for context-dependency of those 
associations. Our theoretical point of departure is that the more resources women have 
compared to their spouses, the higher their intra-household bargaining power to negotiate 
themselves out of unpleasant tasks, particularly in gender-egalitarian and very income 
equal and unequal societies. In traditional societies (which score low on the Gender 
Empowerment Measure (GEM)), the inflexible role of men within the household 
presumably prevents women from bargaining a better position, which in turn negatively 
affects relationship quality. Income equality (low GINI coefficient) may be a prerequisite 
for women’s bargaining position, where more inequality (mid-GINI) may be detrimental 
for it. Nevertheless, extreme income inequality (high GINI) may again be favorable for 
women’s relationship power. Using country fixed effects models on data from the 
Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS), we compare men and women who are in a 
couple (formed after 1995) for eight European countries. We find that absolute resources 
matter more than relative resources, at least for relationship satisfaction: Higher educated 
couples are more satisfied with their relationships, which could suggest lower stress levels 
in those couples (in more traditional contexts). Second, we observe GINI context-
dependency of the association between relative education and relationship satisfaction for 
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women and relative education and exit thoughts for men, although opposite to what we 
expected. Perhaps reference group theory or gender display theory can explain these 
unexpected results. Finally, we find that women have more break-up plans in societies 
with a lower score on GEM. This last result is consistent with the notion that bargaining 
only works in egalitarian contexts.  
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Introduction: broadening our perspective on the impact of resources 
 
Whether one evaluates the increasing divorce trend of the last decades in a positive or 
negative way, investigating this topic is of importance both for policymakers and scholars 
alike. Relative resource theory provides one possible explanation for higher divorce rates. 
Having more resources compared to one’s spouse may increase one’s bargaining position 
within the household and may have consequences for the quality of one’s relationship. In 
this paper, we do not examine divorce itself, but use two alternative measures of 
relationship quality: relationship (dis)satisfaction and whether individuals think about 
breaking up. These subjective measures are correlated with actual divorce (Karney & 
Bradbury, 1995) and more importantly, they are stages in the complex process of divorce. 
When investigating causes of divorce, it is important to examine the onset of the process 
of divorce. 
Using the first wave of the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS)1, we examine 
the correlates of resources with relationship satisfaction and thoughts of divorce in eight 
European countries for both men and women. We contribute to the previous literature in 
three areas: First, we not only consider earnings as resources, but also educational level 
and occupational status. Each of these three types of resources can give a spouse 
bargaining power within the relationship (e.g. Rodman, 1967; Ruppanner, 2010). Second, 
we not only consider the relative level but also the absolute level of spousal resources. 
Not controlling for absolute levels may bias the associations between relative resources 
and marital quality (van Berkel, 1998). Relative resources are actually a measure of 
symmetry within the couple, rather than economic independence, which is what absolute 
resources represent. For instance, a woman whose spouse is a millionaire could earn 20% 
of his income, whereas a woman whose spouse receives minimum income payments 
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could earn 100% of his income. Even though the latter woman earns symmetrically the 
same as her spouse, it is likely that she is more dependent on his income. The absolute 
independence of this woman is still rather low should a separation occur. In that case, she 
would have to rely on other sources of income such as the state, family, or the ex-spouse 
(McKeever & Wolfinger, 2001; van Damme, 2010). Oppenheimer (1997) argues the 
same point. Criticizing Becker’s specialization model empirically and theoretically, she 
stressed that looking at relative resources is not enough and does not provide any 
information about the actual independence of women in a relationship. A third area of 
advance is that we extend previous research in a cross-national way by moderating the 
association between resources and relationship quality by context. We replicate studies 
on spousal resources and relationship quality for eight European countries in addition to 
giving an explanation for within-country differences in the effects of relative and absolute 
resources by referring to the level of gender egalitarianism in a society (measured by the 
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)) and the extent of income inequality (using the 
GINI coefficient of each country year). We chose both Western and Eastern European 
countries to analyze because we would like to see effects of bargaining and absolute 
resources on relationship quality in highly varying contexts. Next to Belgium and France, 
where an increase in GEM scores has been taking place around the millennium, we 
include more traditional (Georgia, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria) and more egalitarian 
(Czech Republic, Lithuania) Eastern-European contexts. Unfortunately, we could not 
include very egalitarian societies like Sweden or Norway because of lack of data on either 
the dependent or one of the main independent variables. But with this country selection, 
we believe to have a good context variation on both the GEM and GINI measures. 
 
Previous findings on resources and relationship quality 
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Relative resources 
Research on relative resources and relationship quality is rather scarce (though there is a 
plethora of studies on relative resources and divorce). Scholars have investigated different 
societies: First, findings for the US have been mixed, varying from insignificant effects 
in old studies (Huber & Spitze, 1980)2, positive effects for men (Brennan, Barnett, & 
Gareis, 2001) or for women (Rogers & DeBoer, 2001) in more recent ones (a relatively 
higher salary is associated with more marital satisfaction), and negative effects on 
relationship satisfaction and positive effects on ‘the marriage is in trouble’-thought in the 
newest study we found (Bertrand, Kamenica, & Pan, 2015). This last finding is in line 
with that which Vannoy and Cubbins (2001) observed for the city of Moscow and Zhang 
et al. (2012) for urban China: A negative effect of wife’s relative income on women’s 
marital satisfaction and a null-effect for men.  
Regarding education, Tynes (1990) found that higher relative education for 
women is associated with more marital satisfaction for both spouses, compared to couples 
in which men are more highly educated than their wives. Eeckhaut et al. (2013), on the 
contrary, found with Dutch data that higher relative education for her is related to lower 
marital satisfaction for men (they did not study women). Gong (2007) found the same for 
the US, but then for women’s marital happiness, and this is especially the case for women 
with traditional gender ideologies.  
The same study (Gong, 2007) reported effects of status inconsistencies between 
the spouses (wife’s occupational status exceeds her husband’s) and lower marital 
happiness of traditional wives. Vannoy and Cubbins (2001) found that Moscow wives’ 
marital quality is not lower when her occupation rank exceeds that of his compared to 
couples where both have a manager/professional position, nor compared to couples in 
which she has a lower occupational rank than he has.  
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Absolute resources 
When it comes to absolute earnings and relationship quality, Brennan et al. (2001) 
examined young men of dual earner couples and found greater relationship satisfaction 
in couples with higher absolute salary, whereas Rogers and DeBoer (2001) found a non-
significant effect for men and a positive association for women. In the same year, Vannoy 
and Cubbins  (2001) checked for individual effects of average monthly income of the 
wife and the husband, but did not find any significant effects. A German study found 
similar insignificant effects of household income on both German men’s and women’s 
relationship satisfaction (Hardie, Geist, & Lucas, 2014), but also an unexpected 
association between male-breadwinner couples and his relationship satisfaction, which 
was lower the more a couple adhered towards a male-breadwinner model.  The most 
recent US study on the effects of absolute resources and relationship quality was 
conducted by Betrand et al. (2015), who controlled the effects of relative income for 
absolute incomes of the spouses, but  did not specify what the absolute income effects 
were.  
Regarding absolute levels of education, Wiik, Lappegård, and Keizer (2010) 
reported a positive association with relationship satisfaction and having plans to break up 
in selected European countries. The authors did not relate context-differences in the 
educational effect to a macro-level indicator (like gender egalitarianism). Similar positive 
effects of wife’s and husband’s educational level on marital quality of both men and 
women were found by Vannoy and Cubbins (2001). Other studies, however, did not find 
significant educational differences in marital satisfaction (Boertien & Härkönen, 2018 for 
the UK; Nock, 1995 for the US), or found opposite effects (higher educated women and 
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men have lower marital satisfaction in the Netherlands (Van den Troost, Vermulst, Gerris, 
Matthijs, & Welkenhuysen-Gybels, 2006).  
When it comes to occupational status effects on relationship satisfaction, we 
found only one study, which found that lower occupational status couples are less 
satisfied with their marriages than couples that are both in a managerial/professional 
position (Vannoy & Cubbins, 2001). 
 
 
Theories and hypotheses on the impact of resources 
 
The sociological (e.g. Blood & Wolfe, 1960) and economic perspective (e.g. Lundberg & 
Pollak, 1996) of bargaining theories both predict similar outcomes concerning the 
consequences of having more intra-household resources. Those with the most resources 
are assumed better able to negotiate themselves out of unpleasant tasks, such as domestic 
work (note that these theories assume that preference/taste for domestic work is low). 
More specifically, more resources provide a spouse with greater marital power, thereby 
giving the spouse greater ability to exchange for what (s)he prefers. Spouses who are 
more dependent on the other in the relationship are less able to bargain for a better 
situation.  
Power is also influenced by a spouses’ fallback position (absolute resources),3 i.e., 
the hypothetical position below which each spouse would fall after a separation. Spouses 
would not be willing to go below a certain level of earnings or standard of living, as this 
would represent a significant deterioration of their position compared to the position that 
they currently enjoy in the union. Therefore, absolute resources matter in addition to 
relative resources: the more absolute resources a spouse has, the better the fallback 
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position and the more influence this person has in decision-making. Because wives’ 
investments (child care and domestic work) are less transferable outside the union and 
more relationship-specific, wives have fewer alternatives out of the union and therefore 
less power within the union (England & Kilbourne, 1990). Just like the previous authors, 
Hobson (1990) adds to this that Hirschman’s (1970) classic study on exit, voice, and 
loyalty can be applied to couple’s marital power. Hobson derives that women in the 
household can either be loyal (and don’t question the division of labour within the 
household), or use their voice and they will do so more when having more resources. 
They can also ‘vote with their feet’ in a situation when they do not agree on the intra-
household division of labour: i.e. exit the relationship. The less resources women have 
though, the fewer their exit possibilities. And the fewer exit possibilities, the weaker the 
voice women have. Indeed, Lennon and Rosenfield (1994) have shown that women who 
have more absolute resources (i.e., a lower post-divorce poverty potential) and have a 
better overall position to fall back on outside of the relationship (not only with respect to 
standard of living, but also regarding social life and career opportunities) more often 
viewed a given division of labor as unfair. In addition, they found that women who 
experienced an inequitable situation as unfair had decreased psychological well-being. 
These considerations have at least two implications for our expectations: First, we expect 
that women with more relative resources are less satisfied with their relationships (H1a). 
This may be due to the fact that women are less satisfied with the division of household 
labor when they get more bargaining power; Second, women with more relative resources 
are more likely to consider leaving the relationship (H2a) because they have a better 
fallback position. See Table 1 for a summary of the hypotheses. 
For men, we also expect to find an association between her comparative resources 
and his relationship quality. In couples in which the woman has more resources than the 
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man, the traditional division of labor is violated (Brines, 1994; Tichenor, 2005; West & 
Zimmerman, 1987). The male spouse does little domestic labor unless both he and his 
wife hold egalitarian beliefs about gender and marital roles (Greenstein, 1996b). It has 
also been suggested that breadwinner wives and dependent husbands continue to ‘do 
gender’ in order to compensate for violation of a traditional division of labor within the 
household (Brines, 1994; Tichenor, 2005). In such cases, men in couples with 
breadwinner wives do not take greater responsibility for the housework to compensate 
for their wives’ contribution, but women would do a ‘second shift’ of domestic work 
(Hochschild & Machung, 1989), with the division of domestic work being equal at best 
(Cooke, 2006). A violation of the traditional division of labor may lead to conflict, which 
in turn may cause the man to be less satisfied with the relationship and more likely to 
think about leaving the relationship. This is a cross-partner effect: her relative resources 
negatively affect his satisfaction (H1b) or positively affect his thoughts of leaving the 
relationship (H2b). Additionally, it might be that for men there is an association between 
women’s relative resources and his marital dissatisfaction via her dissatisfaction. By 
expressing her discontent with the relation, his feelings of satisfaction will be affected, 
creating a spill-over effect (Pouwels, 2011). Lacking couple data, we cannot test this spill-
over effect, but we can still observe the outcome of this mechanism.  
In addition, absolute levels of resources are likely to matter. We have two types 
of expectations about the association between a couples’ absolute level of resources and 
relationship quality. On the one hand, as mentioned above, having more resources of their 
own would increase women’s fall-back position (England & Kilbourne, 1990; Lennon & 
Rosenfeld, 1994), providing them greater economic independence in the event of a break-
up (Oppenheimer, 1997) and would affect relationship satisfaction negatively (H3a for 
women; H3b for men) and exit thoughts positively (H4a for women; H4b for men). On 
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the other hand, more resources in the household (in contrast to the individual) go together 
with less family stress and better relationship quality (Conger & Elder, 1994; 
Oppenheimer, 1997) which increases relationship satisfaction (H5a for women; H5b for 
men) and reduces break-up thoughts (H6a for women; H6b for men).  
Note that selection into a co-residential relationship may also play a role in 
explaining the association between resources and relationship quality: For example, even 
today in the Dutch context, high-resource men are more and high-resource women are 
less likely to form a partnership (Dykstra & Poortman, 2010). This might imply that those 
couples, where women have more resources (than men) are also more likely to break up 
and have a lower relationship satisfaction (as being single is more attractive for them). 
Hence, we would observe only those couples with relatively good relationship quality 
among the ones with many female resources as those with bad quality relationships have 
selected themselves out. With cross-sectional data we cannot estimate the selection effect 
so one has to keep in mind that we might overestimate the association between relative 
resources and relationship quality. 
 
Relative resources and context specificity 
England and Kilbourne (1990) argued a couple of decades ago that there are two main 
things that women would like to change in their marriages: the degree of men’s emotional 
intimacy and the degree of men’s participation in domestic work. In addition, Esping-
Andersen and Billari (2015) emphasized that certain macro-trends seem very hard to 
change: The traditional male breadwinner family would continue to stay for a long time 
and men would resist to take up ‘women’s work’ because it would be stigmatizing (see 
also Brines, 1994; Hobson, 1990). This would especially apply to inegalitarian contexts. 
The more people adhere to inegalitarian norms and the more stubborn gender role 
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patterns, the less women can use their marital power to bargain for a more equal domestic 
work division4. As long as the society remains traditional on average (a certain critical 
mass within society does not take over more gender-egalitarian values (Esping-Andersen 
& Billari, 2015)), relative resources will not translate into marital power and exit would 
be the only option for women if they want to change an unequal marital situation. From 
this, we can derive the expectation that the negative influence of relative resources on 
break-up thoughts will be weaker among women in egalitarian countries than in 
inegalitarian contexts (H2a_norms). We expect a similar context dependency for marital 
satisfaction in egalitarian societies (and therefore predict an opposite association): Women 
with more resources compared to their partners will be happier with their marriages the 
more egalitarian a society is (H1a_norms). The reason for this would be that women 
living in egalitarian contexts could bargain a better position within the relationship while 
they would fail to do so in a traditional environment in which division of labor patterns 
are more persistent (see also Hajdu and Hajdu (2018)).  
 For men, we expect cross-partner and spill-over effects. Equity within the 
household is expected to lead to more happiness in egalitarian societies, not only for her 
but also for him (a spill-over effect). However, a cross-partner effect could also exist: Her 
relative resources directly influence his satisfaction and exit thoughts, with him being 
happier (H1b_norms) and thinking less about breaking up (H2b_norms) when there is 
more equity within the relationship and less intra-household conflict. 
 In addition to context differences in gender role norms, class (in)equality could 
play a role. In unequal contexts with a high GINI coefficient, bargaining could be working 
less compared to equal contexts where the GINI is low. Based on a study of Hobson 
(1990), we actually expect a curvilinear relationship between women’s economic 
dependency within the household and the GINI. In Figure 1 of her study (p.241), Hobson 
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points out that due to the limited labour force participation of women in relatively income 
equal countries like Germany and the Netherlands, women’s dependency is far higher 
than in an unequal country like the US. Sweden lies at the other spectrum of inequality 
(low) and women’s dependency within the household (also low). Hobson describes a 
weak relationship between GINI and women’s relative dependency, but the scatterplot 
hints to a curvilinear relationship with women having better bargaining positions in the 
most equal (e.g. state encouraged dual earner society Sweden) and most unequal contexts 
(e.g. market forced dual earner society US). We will therefore include both the GINI and 
GINI squared to check to what extent a mid-income inequality context goes together with 
less bargaining in the household when women have more resources and thus less 
relationship satisfaction (H1a_inequality) and more exit thoughts (H2a_inequality) and 
whether these associations become more positive in both more income-equal (lowest 
GINI) and more income-unequal contexts (highest GINI). We expect a similar context 
moderation effect for men’s relationship satisfaction (H1b_inequality) and break up 
plans (H2b_inequality).  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
Data, method, and operationalization 
 
Data 
To investigate the extent to which relative and absolute resources are associated with 
relationship quality in different contexts, we use the Generations and Gender Survey 
(GGS). The first wave of this survey was conducted in 19 countries. The sample size is 
65,081 when selecting the eight countries that had responses on the two dependent 
variables and resources. These countries are Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, 
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Georgia, Lithuania, Romania, and Russia. The unit of analysis is the individual (aged 18-
65 years) within a couple who lives with a partner in the same household (and (s)he is not 
enrolled in education as a main activity). Around one third of the persons are not in a 
couple and therefore dropped, thereby reducing the sample to 44,697. Note that we do not 
have couple data, but only observe one of the two partners (see the section on analytical 
approach for the final sample size). 
 
Measures 
We analyze two outcomes: 1) the amount of satisfaction with the relationship, using the 
question: ‘How satisfied are you with your relationship?’. This indicator of relationship 
quality has categories ranging from 0 (not at all satisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied); 2) 
whether the respondent has thoughts of separation is based on the question ‘Over the past 
12 months, have you thought about breaking up your relationship?’, ‘yes’ (1) or ‘no’ (0).  
 Independent variables are three types of wives’ resources compared to the spouse: 
earnings, education, and occupational status. Wives’ relative earnings are measured by 
the log of the annual earnings (in ppp, corrected for inflation)5 of the wife minus the 
annual earnings of the husband6. Wives’ relative education is measured as the highest 
reached educational level in 7 ISCED categories of the wife minus that of the husband. 
For relative occupational status ISCO codes were converted into ISEI scores and the ISEI 
of the woman minus that of the man reflects women’s relative occupational resources. 
Occupation is the job in which the spouse spends most of his/her working hours. To be 
included in the analyses, both spouses needed to be working at the time of interview or 
to have had a job before they became inactive or unemployed.7 We also take women’s 
absolute earnings, household income, average level of education, and average 
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occupational level of the couple into account because the level of resources might bias 
the effects of relative resources.  
 We further take several variables into account that have been proven to affect 
divorce: (1) Intensity of search behavior (age at union formation and (premarital) 
cohabitation); (2) conflict management, dissatisfaction with division of household labor8, 
gender role values; (3) We try to capture some of the socialization processes of the 
respondent with two measures: a) the educational level of the mother when the respondent 
was aged 15. This is a proxy for an equal division of labor within the household during 
childhood, which could relate to norms that are more egalitarian when it comes to house- 
and carework. In such a household, a feeling of independence would be valued and a 
higher educated mother probably also teaches her children that bargaining within the 
couple is a normal thing to do. Moreover, even if such intergenerational transmission of 
values, attitudes, or norms would not take place, it could be that the mother acted as a role 
model by showing that a non-traditional, more egalitarian division of intra-household 
labor is normal (van Putten, 2009); b) an index measuring commitment values of the 
respondent using four items: 1. Marriage is an outdated institution; 2. It is all right for an 
unmarried couple to live together even if they have no interest in marriage; 3. Marriage 
is a lifetime relationship and should never be ended; 4. It is all right for a couple with an 
unhappy marriage to get a divorce even if they have children. The answer categories were 
strongly agree, agree, agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree. Item 3 is recoded 
to have higher scores corresponding with high marriage commitment (Alpha = 0.61). 
We also controlled for the number of paid working hours9, the number of children 
in the age group 0-6 and 7-17, being born in the country, and a curvilinear effect of union 
duration (in months).  
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Note that we do not control for outsourcing as this is a collider variable; i.e. a 
variable that is caused both by resources and by relationship quality (see e.g. Whillans et 
al. (2017)).  
 The gender empowerment measure (GEM) indicates a country’s gender 
egalitarianism. This index is constructed by the United Nations from four indicators 
examining the ability to which women can actively participate in economic and political 
life and take part in decision-making: (1) the percentage of seats held in parliament by 
women; (2) the percentage of women being administrators and managers; (3) the 
percentage of professional and technical workers that are women; (4) the share of income 
earned by women. Higher scores indicate a more gender-egalitarian society (see Table 
2).10 Belgium in 2009 is the most egalitarian context, whereas Georgia in 1995 is the most 
traditional one. 
 
[Table 2] 
 The GINI coefficient measures the degree of variation that the income distribution 
of a country has.  It is the most common measure of income inequality used and assesses 
the extent to which the distribution among households deviates from a perfectly equal 
income distribution. Georgia (1998) is the most income unequal society, whereas 
Belgium (2004) is the most equal one. 
 
[Table 3] 
  
Analytical approach 
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We perform separate analyses for men and women (but these are not couples)11, doing a 
country fixed effects OLS regression with dependent variable ‘relationship satisfaction’ 
and a logistic regression with dependent variable ‘thoughts about separation’.  
An important note is that we use union formation years rather than the year of 
interview as the societal context. Leaving socialization during childhood aside, we 
assume that it is the context in which the spouses started to form a union that shapes 
spouses’ division of labor in household tasks and also the division of resources. The union 
formation year is the period in which the majority of couples divide their domestic and 
paid work and possible negotiation processes based on relative resources will start.  
Because the GEM is only available from 1995 onwards, we drop all relationships 
that started before that year. This leaves us with a sample size of 13,940 men and women 
(of whom 8,019 have at least one employed spouse in the household and have a valid 
score on both earnings and occupational status). Even though there are few missing cases 
on each variable separately, altogether the sample size reduced to 6,959 with listwise 
deletion of all missing cases. We therefore used multiple imputation (by using five 
imputations, MI STATA procedure) to fill in the missing values under the assumption 
that the missingness was not related to the value on each of the missing variables (MAR) 
(N=10,837 for relationship satisfaction and N=10,780 for exit thoughts). These results are 
similar to the results without missing values imputed.  
We run models with potential confounding variables and variables that could be 
either confounders or mediators. Note that for the educational resources models some of 
the potential confounding variables are less likely to be confounders (e.g., age at union 
formation, cohabitation), and they are more likely to be mediators instead. We can never 
be sure about the time order using cross-sectional data, so both models with and without 
potential confounders are tested. 
16 
 
 
 
Results 
 
Descriptive Results 
On average, most respondents are very satisfied with their relationship, although there is 
variation between countries and between men and women. Satisfaction among women is 
highest in Romania (average score on satisfaction is 8.94) and lowest in Russia (score 
8.02), while for men Romania scores highest (score 9.19) and Lithuania lowest (score 
8.66). In all countries, men are more satisfied than women are. In Bulgaria, Romania and 
Georgia, women think the least about breaking up (about 4-5%), whereas in Russia 25% 
have thoughts about breaking up. For the men, the percentages are 1.4-3% and 14%, 
respectively. These gender differences are in line with expectations based on Bernard’s 
(1972) theory of ‘his’ and ‘her’ marriage, stating that men benefit more from a marriage 
(in their mental health) than women. 
Looking at the independent variables, we observe that in many countries women 
on average have more resources relative to their spouses than the other way around (not 
for earnings, but for education and occupational status).12 Reasons for this might be 
twofold: It might have to do with the fact that we are looking at a relatively recent period 
(recently-formed couples). Alternatively, it may be because we only consider working 
men and women (as it is necessary to have (had) a job to determine status or earnings). 
Higher educated women work more often than lower educated women do. 
  
[Table 4] 
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Multivariate models: main effects of relative and absolute resources 
In Tables 5a and b, we estimate multivariate models for each of the two outcomes. As 
Table 5a shows, relative resources relate to relationship satisfaction, but overall absolute 
resources matter more.13 Of the absolute resources, all types of resources matter, whereas 
of the relative resources only relative earnings has a significant association with 
relationship satisfaction (for women). The maximum effect of relative earnings on 
women’s relationship satisfaction is [-0.004*(48 - -85)14=] -0.533, whereas the maximum 
effect of absolute household income is [0.141*(5.06 - -4.24)=] 1.312; of absolute 
education [0.119*(3.60 - -3.32)=] 0.823; and of absolute occupational status 
[0.004*(45.20 - -38.88)=] 0.336. In other words, the more women earn compared to their 
spouses, the lower their satisfaction with the relationship. Higher absolute resources 
(whether they are income, education, or occupational status) go together with more 
relationship satisfaction for women. The associations between resources and satisfaction 
for women become weaker once possible confounding or mediating variables are 
controlled for. Since the time order of these variables is unclear in cross-sectional data, 
we must be cautious in interpreting the results from the second model. For men, higher 
educational and financial resources are associated with more relationship satisfaction. 
The maximum effects are: for household income: 0.650 and for education: 0.623. We do 
not find any cross-partner effects of relative resources on relationship satisfaction for 
men, whichever resources of the wife are considered. For the educational variables, we 
also ran a simpler model with only being born in the country and the education of the 
mother as possible confounders included (and no control variables for other resources 
than education). The effects are somewhat stronger for absolute educational resources 
compared to the more extended models presented in Table 5a.  
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With respect to thoughts about separation (Table 5b), we find some significant 
associations for both relative and absolute resources for women, but not for men. The 
more relative earnings she has compared to her spouse, the more thoughts she has about 
breaking up (maximum effect is 1.065). Also, the more educational resources she has 
compared to her spouse is associated with more thoughts about breaking up: [0.066*(5.00 
- -5.00)=] 0.660. Furthermore, absolute levels of educational and occupational resources 
are associated with her break-up thoughts: In higher educational and occupational 
resource couples, she thinks less about breaking up (maximum effects: for education -
1.044; for occupational status: -0.673. Simpler models for educational resources point to 
similar effects. 
Finally, there is an influence of the context. Societies that are more egalitarian 
have fewer exit thinkers (women) than more traditional societies, which is in line with 
our expectation that women in more traditional societies are more often forced to ‘vote 
with their feet’ than in more egalitarian ones. Also, we find that the more unequal societies 
are the more women think about exiting their romantic co-residential relationship, but this 
effect is only significant in Model 1. 
 
[Table 5a, 5b] 
 
Multivariate models: context-specific effects 
In Tables 6a and b and 7a and b, we present the influence of context as a moderator of the 
relationship between relative resources and our two outcomes. We find cross-level 
interaction effects on relationship satisfaction mainly for educational resources. If the 
couple has a higher education, she reports a higher satisfaction in the most traditional 
context [(-.153*-.349+.161) = .214], but this association becomes much weaker in more 
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gender-egalitarian contexts [(.386*-.349+.161) = .026] (Table 6a). A similar pattern 
applies to him: if he is in a couple with higher education, he reports a higher satisfaction 
in the most traditional context [b=.164], but this association also becomes much weaker 
(and even negative) the more gender egalitarian the context is [b=-.041]. We also find 
significant context moderation effects of the GINI coefficient: Absolute educational and 
household financial resources are stronger positively associated with women’s 
relationship satisfaction in more income unequal contexts: Both the effects of household 
income context [from (-11.81*.009+.136) = .030 in equal to (16.89*.009+.136)= .288 in 
the most unequal society], and a couple’s mean educational level [from .080 to .309] are 
moderated by the GINI. This last cross-level interaction effect is also present for men: 
[from .044 to .216]. In addition, the higher her educational attainment compared to his, 
the more she reports a higher satisfaction in the most equal society [b=.063], but this 
association flattens (with turning point at centered GINI=-2.5 - which is for instance 
Lithuania in 1997 or 2004), and eventually becomes negative in the most unequal society 
[b=-.080] (see also Figure 1). This result is robust to whether we also include the GEM 
as contextual factor in the model. 
 
[Tables 6a, b] 
[Figure 1] 
 
Regarding thoughts of breaking up, we only find a moderation of the relationship 
between relative education and his exit thoughts: The higher she is educated compared to 
him, the less he reports break up plans in the most income equal context (b=-.060). This 
association becomes more negative (turns at centered GINI=1 - e.g. Lithuania in 1999) 
and then increases again (b=-.232 in the most unequal context).  
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[Tables 7a, b] 
[Figure 2] 
 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
 
In this paper, we studied the association between resources and relationship quality. We 
expected that more relative resources for women would be associated with more power 
for women. We also expected spill-over and cross-partner effects to occur for men. 
Moreover, we not only took couple’s relative resources into account but also their 
absolute levels. We looked at earnings, education, and occupational status as resources 
and scrutinized context-dependent effects on satisfaction with the relationship and 
thoughts about divorce.  
This paper offers several general findings and implications: (1) First and most 
importantly, taking both the relative and absolute level of resources into account turned 
out to be a fruitful exercise. For satisfaction with the relationship, absolute resources 
matter most (positive effect) (for all types of resources for women and for financial and 
educational resources for men). Also, more absolute educational and occupational 
resources are related to less break-up plans for women (see also Wiik et al. (2010) for 
several countries). Hence, consistent with Conger and Elder’s (1994) family stress model, 
it is crucial to consider a couple’s absolute resources: spouses are more likely to exhibit 
warm and supportive behaviors if they are economically secure. In addition, a robust 
effect we found is that of the couple’s educational resources on men’s and women’s 
relationship satisfaction, which is in line with the results for most countries of the study 
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of Wiik et al. (2010). What is it about education that makes couples more satisfied? We 
may speculate that having more educational resources can go together with having better 
interpersonal skills so that communication among higher educated couples is smoother 
than among lower educated couples. Moreover, we do find that this positive association 
is weaker the more egalitarian and income-equal the context is.  Note that in our models 
we have taken into account (to some extent) selection into a co-a residential relationship 
by including the age at union formation.  
(2) Furthermore, we found that relative earnings matter negatively for women’s 
relationship satisfaction and relative earnings and education go together with more 
thoughts about breaking up for women. This result confirms the findings of Bertrand et 
al. (2015) who also found a relative resources effect in the US context. Thus, women’s 
bargaining power as measured by earnings decreases her relationship quality, which is in 
line with the relative resources and bargaining theories (Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Lundberg 
& Pollak, 1996). What is not in line with these theories is the lack of presence of cross-
partner or spill-over effects of relative resources for men’s relationship quality. 
Apparently, bargaining only is effective for women’s relationship quality and does not 
affect men’s relationship satisfaction or break-up thoughts.  
(3)  Looking at education and occupational status as resources in addition to 
earnings broadened our perspective on power relationships and its consequences for 
relationship quality. We saw that relative education mattered for women’s and men’s exit 
thoughts, indicating that bargaining power based on educational resources is likely to 
occur. Bargaining power might even be particularly captured by education and not 
earnings or occupational status as there is communication involved to get what one 
prefers. 
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In addition, her relative educational resources in the couple affected men and 
women differently according to the income inequality in a society. Her relative 
educational level turns out the least harmful in middle-equal contexts (she is most 
satisfied with her relationship). Perhaps, women living in middle-income contexts are 
happier with their relationship the more resources they have because they compare 
themselves with worse off traditional main breadwinner couples. Such a reference group 
comparison would be less likely in a low GINI country like Sweden with many dual 
earners and a more equal division of household labour among most Swedish families or 
with the higher social layers of a high GINI country like the US where outsourcing is the 
norm (which also creates gender equality within the couple and alleviates women’s 
‘second shift’). Reference group research is still an underexplored avenue in relative 
resources research, although Greenstein (1996a) already suggested two decades ago to 
focus on relative deprivation and subjectively perceived inequity within couples rather 
than objective inequalities only.  
For men, we find a similar unexpected result: He thinks the least about breaking-
up in mid-equal contexts. Here, an explanation might be that at least in the most unequal 
societies, there might be more intra-couple conflict, because he does not increase his 
domestic work hours while she violates the traditional division of paid labor by having a 
relatively higher educational level, an indication that gender trumps resources (see e.g. 
Bittman, England, Folbre, Sayer, & Matheson, 2003 for an example of testing the 'gender 
display' theory (Brines, 1994)). Note, however, that we also controlled for contextual 
gender norms by including the GEM. It might still be, however, that in unequal societies, 
we do not capture the impact of traditional individual gender ideologies. Assessment of 
the influence of gender ideology is another direction of future research that could be 
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explored (see e.g. Nitsche & Grunow, 2018 on the impact of relative resources on the 
division of child care work in 'egalitarian island' couples).  
(4) Our findings also have some consequences for Oppenheimer’s (1997) income 
independence interpretation (only absolute resources provide information about the actual 
independence of women in a relationship and the more earnings she has, the more likely 
she will be able to leave a romantic relationship). We did not observe that more female 
earnings relate to more exit thoughts for her, although in models that only include 
women’s absolute earnings (and not relative ones), we do find this effect. Due to 
multicollinearity we could not disentangle the absolute from the relative effect in the 
presented models and this is an important limitation of the measurement of resources via 
earnings in this study.  
(5) Finally, we found contextual (main) effects: We found that the GINI mattered 
as contextual factor: In more income unequal societies, women think more about breaking 
up. Most importantly, we also found that women in more traditional societies think more 
about breaking up than in more egalitarian societies (for men, the effect is in the same 
direction, but insignificant). Women in traditional societies are perhaps forced to ‘vote 
with their feet’ if they want to change the intra-household situation. In such societies, 
bargaining would not work. Of course, the cultural context coincides partly with the 
policy context and the one on work-life balance in particular. For instance, in Belgium 
and France, public child care arrangements for 0-3 and 3-6 year olds are more ample than 
in the Eastern-European countries (OECD, 2006), whereas parental leave in the Western- 
and Eastern European societies of our GGS sample are on a par with around 104-156 
weeks of paid leave around the year 2000. Thus, it could be that not the egalitarian gender 
role norms in a society, but rather the generous childcare policies that ease combining 
work and care are explaining women’s lower likelihood to think about breaking up. 
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Unfortunately, we could not disentangle these effects as there are no country year data 
available on work-life balance policies, but it is likely that both policy and culture play a 
role (Pfau-Effinger, 2005). 
(6) To conclude, spouses appear to experience differences in power within their 
romantic relationships and education seems to be an important indicator of this. As long 
as the context is not egalitarian to some extent and the income inequality is high, 
educational differences in relationship quality will exist. Policy makers could address this 
educational inequality between couples for instance by encouraging better work-life 
balance policies that support more equal gender role norms within society.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Hypotheses on relationship satisfaction and break up plans for men and women by relative and absolute resources.  
 Relationship 
satisfaction 
Break up plans Relationship satisfaction 
* Gender norms 
Break up plans* Gender 
norms 
Relationship satisfaction * 
Income inequality 
Break up plans* Income 
inequality 
Relative 
resources 
Women: -  (H1a) 
Men: - (H1b) 
Women: + (H2a) 
Men: + (H2b) 
Women: - traditional-> + 
egalitarian (H1a_norms) 
Men: - traditional -> + 
egalitarian (H1b_norms) 
Women: + traditional-> - 
egalitarian (H2a_norms) 
Men: + traditional -> - 
egalitarian (H2b_norms) 
Women: + curvilinear: the 
more inequality, 
association from - -> + -> - 
(H1a_inequality) 
Men: + curvilinear: the 
more inequality, 
association from - -> + -> - 
(H1b_inequality) 
Women: - curvilinear: the 
more inequality, 
association from + -> - -> + 
(H2a_inequality) 
Men: + curvilinear: the 
more inequality, 
association from + -> - -> + 
(H2b_inequality) 
Absolute 
individual 
resources 
Women: -  (H3a) 
Men: - (H3b) 
Women: +  (H4a) 
Men: + (H4b) 
    
Absolute 
household 
resources 
Women: +  (H5a) 
Men: + (H5b) 
Women: -  (H6a) 
Men: - (H6b) 
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Table 2. Gender Empowerment Measure scores for eight countries.  
 Bulgaria Russia Georgia France Romania Belgium Lithuania Czech 
Republic 
1995 0.481 0.375 0.335 0.433 0.352 0.479 0.451 0.473 
1996 0.486 0.385 0.340 0.437 0.368 0.580 0.460 0.486 
1997 0.487 0.395 0.345 0.452 0.381 0.591 0.470 0.497 
1998 0.462 0.405 0.350 0.489 0.402 0.600 0.479 0.511 
1999 0.457 0.415 0.355 0.499 0.400 0.610 0.517 0.524 
2000 0.453 0.426 0.360 0.506 0.405 0.725 0.531 0.537 
2001 0.446 0.434 0.365 0.517 0.449 0.692 0.474 0.546 
2002 0.439 0.450 0.370 0.535 0.450 0.706 0.483 0.560 
2003 0.431 0.440 0.381 0.566 0.460 0.695 0.499 0.579 
2004 0.424 0.467 0.387 0.556 0.465 0.808 0.508 0.586 
2005   0.416 0.582 0.488 0.828 0.614 0.595 
2006   0.407   0.855 0.635  
2007/8      0.850   
2009      0.874   
GGS data ran until the following years: BG: 2004, RU: 2004, GE: 2006, FR: 2005, RO: 2005, BE: 2010, LT: 2006, CZ: 2005. 
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Table 3. GINI coefficient for eight countries.  
 Bulgaria Russia Georgia France Romania Belgium Lithuania Czech 
Republic 
1995 38.4 43.9  29 30.6 29 33.3 21.6 
1996 35.7 50.1 37.13 29 30.2 28 34.7 23 
1997 36.6 38.41 49.8 29 30.5 27 30.9 23.9 
1998 34.5 44.6 50.3 28 29.8 27 33.2 25.8 
1999 32.6 37.44 40.15 29 29.9 29 34.3 23.2 
2000 33.2 43.2 40.48 28 31 30 35.5 23.1 
2001 33.3 42.2 45.8 27 35.3 28 35.4 23.7 
2002 37 49.1 45.4 27 34.9  35.7 23.4 
2003 35.1 40.69 39.53 27 35.2 28.3 31.8 24.6 
2004 35.8 46.9 39.78 28.2 35.9 26.1 30.9 23.5 
2005   40.34 27.7 36.1 28 36.3 25.8 
2006   39.71   27.8 35  
2007/8      26.3   
2009      27.5   
GGS data ran until the following years: BG: 2004, RU: 2004, GE: 2006, FR: 2005, RO: 2005, BE: 2010, LT: 2006, CZ: 2005. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of dependent and main independent variables (women or men’s reports). Means and percentages (standard deviations in brackets); range; MI 
dataset 1 
  Bulgaria Russia Georgia France Romania Belgium Lithuania Czech Republic 
Dependent variables         
Relationship satisfaction         
 Women 8.68 (1.70) 8.02 (2.21) 8.49 (1.74) 8.51 (1.34) 8.94 (1.22) 8.72 (1.26) 8.27 (1.62) 8.66 (1.75) 
 Men 8.97 (1.48) 8.76 (1.64) 8.99 (1.43) 8.82 (1.19) 9.19 (1.01) 8.94 (1.18) 8.66 (1.28) 8.73 (1.64) 
Having thought about breaking up         
 Women 4.59 25  4.72  15 4.47  14 21  13  
 Men 1.4  14  3.0  6.4 2.0  8.7 12  9.7 
Resources (centered)          
Log relative earnings           
 Women -12 (21) -16 (24) -25 (23) -9.63 (23) -13 (21) -6.21 (19) -7.68 (19) -14 (23) 
 Men -0.77 (10) 0.27 (9.8) -4.35 (12) 1.01 (8.9) -2.64 (12) -0.11 (12) -0.96 (12) -1.31 (12) 
Log female earnings          
 Women 0.09 (3.90) 0.39 (3.84) -2.96 (2.99) 2.53 (3.89) -0.15 (3.98) 2.68 (3.84) 1.61 (3.81) 0.59 (4.27) 
 Men 1.52 (3.56) 3.05 (2.60) 0.56 (3.66) 4.20 (2.70) 1.59 (3.66) 3.66 (3.53) 2.43 (3.71) 2.47 (3.78) 
Log household income           
 Women -0.15 (0.94) -0.01 (0.85) -0.57 (0.92) 0.43 (1.15) 1.17 (1.01) 2.14 (1.04) 1.11 (0.91) -0.90 (0.94) 
 Men -0.23 (1.00) -0.06 (0.87) -0.65 (1.11) 0.59 (1.22) 1.24 (0.95) 2.31 (0.99) 1.05 (0.88) -0.93 (0.94) 
Relative education          
 Women 0.24 (0.98) 0.11 (1.14) 0.008 (1.06) 0.17 (1.86) -0.10 (0.84) 0.22 (1.35) 0.26 (1.08) 0.01 (1.09) 
 Men 0.20 (0.93) 0.33 (1.16) -0.06 (1.02) -0.068 (1.91) -0.09 (0.80) 0.14 (1.32) 0.12 (1.02) -0.08 (1.09) 
Average educational level partners         
 Women -0.05 (1.11) 0.69 (0.88) 0.56 (0.92) 0.50 (1.35) -0.17 (0.95) 0.43 (1.19) 0.37 (0.88) 0.06 (0.93) 
 Men -0.28 (1.07) 0.67 (0.85) 0.45 (0.95) 0.38 (1.34) -0.23 (1.01) 0.43 (1.18) 0.36 (0.89) 0.01 (0.94) 
Relative occupational status         
 Women 0.68 (15) 3.86 (18) 3.85 (17) 0.81 (15) 0.65 (13) 1.14 (17) 2.66 (18) 0.28 (16) 
 Men 2.05 (15) 2.28 (19) 4.21 (17) 0.43 (16) 1.65 (13) -0.21 (17) 1.20 (17) -1.48 (15) 
Average occupational status partners         
 Women 0.43 (11) 0.87 (12) 0.66 (12) 2.62 (12) -2.42 (13) 5.84 (12) 1.52 (13) 1.66 (11) 
 Men -0.94 (10) -0.325 (12) 0.39 (13) 2.65 (12) -3.11 (12) 5.99 (12) 2.75 (13) 0.29 (11) 
         
N Women 959 862 614 835 716 885 595 638 
 Men 760 648 461 638 855 758 793 699 
a For France, Romania, and Belgium, only the first two digits of the ISCO codes were available 
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Table 5a. Country fixed effects OLS regression of relationship satisfaction (women’s and men’s reports). 
 Women  Men   
 M1 M2 M1 M2  
Log relative earnings (centered) -0.004*   -0.003**  -0.003    -0.000   
Log female earnings (centered) -0.007     0.000     0.013     0.003   
Log household income (centered)  0.141***  0.072**   0.061**   0.016   
Relative education (centered) -0.033    -0.016     0.004     0.008   
Mean education (centered)  0.119***  0.062**   0.087***  0.049*  
Relative occupational status (centered) -0.001    -0.000    -0.001    -0.001   
Mean occupational status (centered)  0.004*    0.002    -0.001    -0.000   
Age at union formation -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.001    -0.001   
Union duration -0.011*** -0.007*** -0.005**  -0.004** 
Union duration^2  0.000***  0.000***  0.000**   0.000*  
(Premarital) cohabitation -0.075     0.063    -0.113**  -0.012   
Number of children under 6 years -0.041     0.035    -0.013     0.027   
Number of children 7-17 years  -0.171*** -0.074**  -0.089**  -0.053*  
Education of mother when age 15  0.001    -0.010     0.049**   0.021   
Native  0.213*    0.117    -0.093     0.005   
Bad conflict management  -0.178***    -0.154*** 
Being unsatisfied with division of labor  -0.439***    -0.404*** 
Egalitarian gender role values   0.115***     0.062*   
Number of working hours   0.001        0.002    
Commitment values   0.178***     0.155*** 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
GEM (centered)   0.340  0.094   0.265  -0.078  
GINI (centered)  -0.007 -0.007  -0.001  -0.006  
Constant 9.336*** 9.195*** 9.262*** 8.827*** 
N 5602 5602 5235 5235 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, one-tailed tested; standard errors GEM and GINI coefficients are clustered on the country level 
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Table 5b. Country fixed effects logistic regression of thoughts about breaking up (women’s and men’s reports). 
 Women  Men   
 M1 M2 M1 M2  
Log relative earnings (centered)   0.008*    0.008      0.002     0.001   
Log female earnings (centered)   0.001     0.030     -0.031    -0.030   
Log household income (centered)  -0.009     0.063      0.006     0.035   
Relative education (centered)   0.066*    0.067*     0.030     0.022   
Mean education (centered)  -0.151**  -0.078     -0.054     0.009   
Relative occupational status (centered)   0.003     0.002      0.001     0.002   
Mean occupational status (centered)  -0.008*   -0.003      0.008     0.010   
Age at union formation   0.010*    0.015**   -0.007    -0.007   
Union duration   0.006     0.000      0.001    -0.000   
Union duration^2  -0.000**  -0.000     -0.000    -0.000   
(Premarital) cohabitation   0.562***  0.396***   0.623***  0.445** 
Number of children under 6 years  -0.228**  -0.286***  -0.197*   -0.267** 
Number of children  7-17 years    0.228***  0.100      0.124     0.108   
Education of mother when age 15   0.145***  0.158***   0.004     0.016   
Native  -0.296*   -0.291     -0.201    -0.263   
Bad conflict management    0.381***    0.317*** 
Being unsatisfied with division of labor    0.259***    0.197*** 
Egalitarian gender role values   -0.037       0.025    
Number of working hours   -0.011***   -0.000    
Commitment values   -0.415***   -0.260**  
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
GEM (centered)  -2.320***  -1.883***  -1.914 -1.454 
GINI (centered)   0.016**    0.013   0.005  0.014 
Constant -3.876***   -3.907*** -4.414*** -4.189*** 
N 5592 5592 5188 5188 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, one-tailed tested; standard errors GEM and GINI coefficients are clustered on the country level 
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Table 6a. Country fixed effects OLS regression of relationship satisfaction (women’s and men’s reports). Interactions of resources*GEM. All variables are centered. Models 1 
(without mediating variables) 
 Women Men Women Men Women Men 
Log relative earnings   -0.003*    -0.003       -0.003*    -0.003    
Log female earnings  -0.007      0.013*      -0.006      0.012    
Log household income   0.144***   0.059**      0.142***   0.061**  
Relative education -0.031      0.004    -0.040*      -0.005     -0.032      0.004    
Mean education  0.121***   0.089***  0.161***     0.106***   0.122***   0.090*** 
Relative occupational status -0.001     -0.001       -0.001     -0.001    
Mean occupational status  0.004*    -0.001        0.004*    -0.001    
GEM  0.979    0.327  1.469***   0.644*   0.369    0.385 
GINI -0.007   -0.001 -0.007      0.001   -0.007   -0.001 
Relative earnings*GEM  0.017 -0.006      
Female earnings*GEM  -0.056 -0.090      
Household income*GEM -0.234  0.136      
Relative education*GEM     0.169    0.215     
Mean education*GEM     -0.349*  -0.381**   
Relative occupational status*GEM       0.004   -0.005 
Mean occupational status*GEM      -0.007   -0.021 
Controlled for confoundersa  YES YES SOME SOME YES YES 
N 5602 5235 5679 5365 5602 5235 
aFor the models with education as effects of interest, certain confounders are rather mediators. Therefore, we did not control for that many variables as for the earnings and occupational status models 
(we only included education of the mother and being born in the country as possible confounders in the initial educational models). 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, one-tailed tested 
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Table 6b. Country fixed effects OLS regression of relationship satisfaction (women’s and men’s reports). Interactions of resources*GINI. All variables are centered. Models 1 
(without mediating variables) 
 Women Men Women Men Women Men 
Log relative earnings   -0.001    -0.002       -0.003*   -0.003    
Log female earnings  -0.007     0.013       -0.006     0.012    
Log household income   0.136***  0.032        0.142***  0.061**  
Relative education  -0.031     0.004     0.004     0.015      -0.031     0.005    
Mean education   0.119***  0.090***  0.174***  0.115***    0.125***  0.091*** 
Relative occupational status  -0.001    -0.001       -0.001    -0.001    
Mean occupational status   0.004*   -0.001        0.005*   -0.003    
GEM   0.366   0.244   1.417***   0.588*   0.372    0.288 
GINI  -0.016  -0.000  -0.008      0.001   -0.007   -0.001 
Relative earnings*GINI  0.000    0.000     
Relative earnings*GINI^2 -0.000   -0.000     
Female earnings*GINI  -0.001    0.001     
Female earnings*GINI^2 -0.000    0.000     
Household income*GINI  0.009*  -0.005     
Household income*GINI^2  0.000    0.001     
Relative education*GINI    -0.005    -0.002      
Relative education*GINI^2    -0.001**  -0.000      
Mean education*GINI     0.008**   0.006*     
Mean education*GINI^2    -0.000    -0.000      
Relative occupational status*GINI       0.000     0.000    
Relative occupational status*GINI^2      -0.000    -0.000    
Mean occupational status*GINI       0.000     0.000    
Mean occupational status*GINI^2      -0.000     0.000    
Controlled for confoundersa  YES YES SOME SOME YES YES 
N 5602 5235 5679 5365 5602 5235 
aFor the models with education as effects of interest, certain confounders are rather mediators. Therefore, we did not control for that many variables as for the earnings and occupational status models 
(we only included education of the mother and being born in the country as possible confounders in the initial educational models). 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, one-tailed tested 
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Table 7a. Country fixed effects OLS regression of breaking up plans (women’s and men’s reports). Interactions of resources*GEM. All variables are centered. Models 1 (without 
mediating variables) 
 Women Men Women Men Women Men 
Log relative earnings   0.009*     0.003     0.008*   0.002    
Log female earnings -0.000     -0.040*    0.002   -0.032    
Log household income -0.008      0.030    -0.011    0.008    
Relative education  0.064*     0.033   0.076*    0.038  0.063*   0.028    
Mean education -0.156**   -0.057  -0.169*** -0.058 -0.153** -0.060    
Relative occupational status  0.003      0.001     0.002    0.001    
Mean occupational status -0.007*     0.009    -0.007    0.008    
GEM  -2.744*  -1.613  1.582*   1.566  -2.261*   -2.436   
GINI   0.015    0.003  0.008   -0.001   0.014     0.005   
Relative earnings*GEM -0.030   -0.022      
Female earnings*GEM   0.123    0.238      
Household income*GEM -0.007   -0.566      
Relative education*GEM     0.074  -0.167      
Mean education*GEM     -0.363   0.411      
Relative occupational status*GEM       0.008   0.045  
Mean occupational status*GEM      -0.025   0.043  
Controlled for confoundersa  YES YES SOME SOME YES YES 
N 5592 5188 5614 5200 5592 5188 
aFor the models with education as effects of interest, certain confounders are rather mediators. Therefore, we did not control for that many variables as for the earnings and occupational status models 
(we only included education of the mother and being born in the country as possible confounders in the initial educational models). 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, one-tailed tested 
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Table 7b. Country fixed effects OLS regression of breaking up plans (women’s and men’s reports). Interactions of resources*GINI. All variables are centered. Models 1 (without 
mediating variables) 
 Women Men Women Men Women Men 
Log relative earnings     0.007    -0.004      0.008*     0.002  
Log female earnings   -0.008    -0.044      0.003     -0.031  
Log household income    0.028     0.028     -0.010      0.004  
Relative education    0.064*    0.032    0.112*    -0.131*   0.064*     0.032  
Mean education   -0.152**  -0.050   -0.153**   -0.077   -0.154**   -0.054  
Relative occupational status    0.003     0.001     -0.000      0.001  
Mean occupational status   -0.008*    0.009     -0.009      0.007  
GEM -2.293*  -2.070         1.544*    1.673* -2.348* -2.050 
GINI  0.012   -0.011         0.008    -0.019   0.012   0.004 
Relative earnings*GINI  0.000 -0.001     
Relative earnings*GINI^2  0.000  0.000     
Female earnings*GINI   0.001  0.000     
Female earnings*GINI^2  0.000  0.000     
Household income*GINI  0.000  0.014     
Household income*GINI^2 -0.001 -0.000     
Relative education*GINI    0.007 -0.006      
Relative education*GINI^2   -0.000  0.003**    
Mean education*GINI    0.009 -0.007      
Mean education*GINI^2   -0.000  0.001      
Relative occupational status*GINI     -0.000   -0.000  
Relative occupational status*GINI^2      0.000    0.000  
Mean occupational status*GINI      0.000   -0.000  
Mean occupational status*GINI^2      0.000    0.000  
Controlled for confoundersa  YES YES SOME SOME YES YES 
N 5592 5188 5614 5200 5592 5188 
aFor the models with education as effects of interest, certain confounders are rather mediators. Therefore, we did not control for that many variables as for the earnings and occupational status models 
(we only included education of the mother and being born in the country as possible confounders in the initial educational models). 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, one-tailed tested 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Cross-level curvilinear interaction effect of GINI with relative education on women’s relationship 
satisfaction 
 
Figure 2. Cross-level curvilinear interaction effect of GINI with relative education on men’s break up plans 
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Notes 
1 We are aware of the disadvantages of using cross-sectional data for investigating causal 
relationships, but since research in this field is still scarce, even cross-sectional data brings us an 
important step forward.  
2 Note that the study of Huber and Spitze (1980) did not consider absolute earnings when 
looking at the effect of relative earnings. 
3 Referred to as external ‘threat point’ in the economic literature. 
4 Note that also individual level gender role beliefs could influence partner’s negotiations. We 
checked interactions of relative resources with individual level gender role values, but found no 
significant effects.  
5 Cross-national comparability of both spouses’ earnings was done by Joanne Muller (Earnings 
File (W1) provided on http://www.ggp-i.org/data, retrieved April 13, 2017).  
6 We take the natural logarithm of wife’s relative earnings to transform the right skewed distribution 
into a normally distributed one. 
7 To check whether this sample selection affects our results, we also included a human capital 
measure instead of earnings (Sullivan and Gershuny, 2016).This did not substantially change 
the results so we present here only the results using earnings. 
8 We do not include the division of household labor itself, since this is a collider variable. 
9 In many countries, women working more hours have been found to be more likely to break up 
(Van Damme and Kalmijn, 2014). We do not expect to find a relationship for men though but 
include the variable anyway for consistency among the models. 
10 As a sensitivity check, we ran models with aggregated gender role values (from GGS) instead 
of GEM as a macro-indicator of the degree of gender egalitarianism in a country. We did not find 
any significant effect of this aggregated measure as a main effect. With respect to the interactions 
with resources, we find weaker effects than when including GEM. Note that a macro-indicator 
from another source would be a more reliable measure than this aggregated measure of GGS on 
values. Unfortunately, in other data sources there is no other time-varying measure of gender 
egalitarianism available. 
11 Note that there can be gender bias in men’s and women’s reporting of the same variable 
(Doorten, 2008). 
12 Notice the gender bias in reporting. Men report more often that they are higher educated than 
women. 
13 Note that the correlation between relative earnings and absolute individual earnings for women 
is rather high (around 0.75 for women). Such high correlations make it difficult to disentangle 
relative from absolute resources effects for earnings. Therefore, we also ran all models with 
relative earnings only included (minor changes in the coefficients). Associations between absolute 
and relative levels of education and occupational status are very low and thus can be 
distinguished from one another. 
14 Between brackets is the range of the variable. 
                                                   
